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Twenty Years After the Anthrax Terrorist Attacks of 2001
Lessons Learned and Unlearned for the COVID-19 Response
The 20th anniversary of the terrorist attacks on
September 11, 2001, resulted in deep national reflection. Less remembered are the events that began to
unfold 7 days later as anonymous letters laced with
deadly anthrax (Bacillus anthracis) spores began arriving at postal facilities, media companies, and congressional offices. The first death from inhaled anthrax
exposure occurred on October 5, with an additional 4
deaths and 17 infections over the ensuing months.1 The
anthrax attacks exposed a health system ill-equipped
to respond to acute emergencies.

Modernizing the Health System
Before 2001, state and local health departments operated mostly during weekday business hours, with limited capacity for coordination. 2 State laboratories
were largely unable to test for anthrax or other bioterrorism agents. The health care sector was also
unprepared, unable to effectively diagnose and treat
patients infected with novel pathogens. Hospitals
lacked operational plans for a surge response or to initiate crisis standards of care.
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expanded 2 key grant programs. The Public Health Emergency Preparedness cooperative agreement and the
Hospital Preparedness Program provided dedicated
funding to health departments and hospitals for human resources and emergency response.
Federal programs also helped coordinate federal,
state, tribal, and local health agencies and defined unified preparedness goals. Before 2001, the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) conducted all
testing for bioterrorism agents, whereas today, a network of approximately 120 laboratories uses standardized methods to test for biological threat agents.2 The
US established the National Strategic Stockpile (SNS) to
distribute medicines, vaccines, and medical supplies
to the states in a health emergency. Health departments operate around the clock, have plans to distribute the SNS resources, and have systems to communicate with the public and hospitals.

The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act

The anthrax attacks also highlighted fragmented and antiquated public health laws. State health codes evolved
independently, leading to profound
variation in their structure, substance,
and procedures. Disparate laws underThe anthrax attacks in 2001 through
mined coordination among state and nato the COVID-19 pandemic 19 years later
tional authorities. Following the anthrax attacks, the CDC tasked the Center
revealed deep fissures in public health
for Law and the Public’s Health at
emergency preparedness.
Georgetown and Johns Hopkins universities to draft the Model State EmerBefore the events of 2001, there was little formal gency Health Powers Act (MSEHPA), which was comcoordination among hospitals and no dedicated strat- pleted on December 21, 2001.4 By 2006, 38 states had
egy for responding to biological and other threats. But adopted the MSEHPA in whole or in part. The MSEHPA
after the anthrax attacks, hospitals developed emer- requires states to develop health emergency plans, degency operations plans for a range of scenarios, includ- fines a declared emergency, and provides extensive
ing bioterrorism and pandemic influenza.3 Key hospital emergency powers.
reforms included patient surge plans, interoperable
communication systems, and planning for hospital Preparedness for Influenza, Ebola,
evacuations. Hospitals also organized into health care and Zika Viruses
coalitions to jointly plan for health emergencies and The 2009 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic put new emergency systems to their first major test. Within weeks of
share resources.
identifying the novel influenza virus, the CDC developed and deployed to states a test to diagnose infecEnhanced Federal Capacities
Federal programs established after 2001 changed the tions. The SNS allocated personal protective equippublic health landscape. In 2002, the Department of ment to states. Health departments investigated
Health and Human Services created the Office of Pub- outbreaks and conducted surveillance at hospitals and
lic Health Emergency Preparedness (OPHEP) to coor- health clinics. The Government Accountability Office
dinate federal agencies. The OPHEP provided funding concluded, “Prior pandemic planning and federal fundfor health departments and hospitals for bioterrorism ing paid off.”5
Health emergency preparedness, however, began
planning. The Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness
Act of 2006 replaced the OPHEP with the Office of the to wane after the influenza A(H1N1) pandemic, and the
Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response and West African Ebola virus epidemic exposed national
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vulnerabilities. In 2014, a symptomatic traveler from Liberia presented to a Dallas hospital but was discharged without adequate
diagnostic assessment. When he returned to the hospital days
later, he was diagnosed with Ebola virus disease. Subsequently,
2 nurses in that Dallas hospital contracted Ebola virus disease, and 1
had traveled on a commercial airline.
On the heels of the Ebola virus epidemic, another health crisis
emerged: a Zika virus disease epidemic in the Caribbean and the
Americas, which was linked to severe birth defects. Congress did not
authorize funding for surveillance, mosquito control, and health
worker training until 7 months later. By 2018, the CDC reported more
than 4800 pregnancies in which mothers tested positive for Zika
virus disease; 1450 infants from these pregnancies were examined
at age 1 year or older, and 14% had health effects likely due to exposure to the virus.6

Lessons Unlearned in the COVID-19 Response
The failure to sustain public health readiness has had tragic consequences for the ongoing COVID-19 response, with the US surpassing 700 000 COVID-19–related deaths in early October 2021. As
memories of the faulty response to the anthrax attacks faded, so too
did US commitments to sustain public health readiness. Adjusting
for inflation, federal preparedness funding for state and local health
departments decreased by nearly half between 2003 and 2021, from
$939 million to $695 million.7 Federal funding for hospital preparedness decreased by nearly two-thirds, from $515 million in 2003 to
$280 million in 2021 (adjusting for inflation).7
The global economic crisis of 2008 exacerbated federal funding cuts, as states also reduced public health spending. By 2018, 10%
of 591 health departments that responded to a stratified, randomized survey reported emergency preparedness cuts.8 More important were the steep reductions in the public health workforce; more
than 55 000 jobs were lost. Staff shortages left health departments unable to adequately conduct case investigations and contact tracing. Amid the COVID-19 crisis, Congress had to enact the
American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 to fund COVID-19 testing, contact tracing, and mitigation.
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The federal government did not replenish the SNS after the
2009 influenza pandemic, which left many hospitals without access to sufficient supplies of personal protective equipment. The
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Whereas the CDC led a nationwide effort to modernize and expand
public health authorities after the anthrax attacks, the COVID-19 pandemic has resulted in the weakening of public health powers.

Strengthening Pandemic Preparedness
The anthrax attacks in 2001 through to the COVID-19 pandemic 19
years later revealed deep fissures in public health emergency preparedness. A key similarity between these 2 events was the failure
of ill-equipped health departments and hospitals to adequately
respond. When each health crisis occurred, the nation urgently provided emergency funding, only to be followed by continued deterioration of health capacities. Ending the cycle of panic and neglect
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COVID-19 response, beginning with a rigorous after-action report
comparable with that of the 9/11 Commission. It will be essential to
understand why the US allowed its health capabilities to deteriorate and to identify a comprehensive strategy to end the vicious
circle of panic to neglect.
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